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In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6026C 
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK and SUFFOLK COUNTY 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Joint Employer, 
-and- - • . 
SUFFOLK COUNTY ASSOCIATION OF MUNICIPAL 
EMPLOYEES, INC., 
Intervenor/lncumbent. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted ,in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in abcordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected,1 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Suffolk County Association of Municipal 
Employees, Inc., has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for "the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All College Aides who are jointly employed for Taylor Law purposes 
by Suffolk County and Suffolk County Community College. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Suffolk County Association of Municipal Employees, Inc. 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 12, 2012 
Albany, New York 
// Jerome Lefkowftz, Chsrifjzerson 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
LOCAL 529, ' 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6027 
TOWN OF CAMPBELL, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Local 529 has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-6027 page 2 
Included: All full-time and part-time employees of the Town of Campbell 
highway department, including deputy highway superintendent, 
heavy motor equipment operators, motor equipment operators and 
laborers. 
Excluded: All elected and managerial or confidential employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 529. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 12, 2012 
Albany, New York 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, 
AFT,AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6030 
SISULU-WALKER CHARTER SCHOOL OF HARLEM, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, 
AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majorityof the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances.1 
1
 On May 8, 2012, the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation . 
(Director) rendered a determination pursuant to §201.9(g)(1) of PERB's Rules of 
Procedure (Rules), concluding that petitioner satisfied the requirements for a 
certification without an election. Respondent waived its right to administratively 
challenge the Director's determination by failing to file written objections to the 
certification with the Board in accordance with §201.9(g)(1) of the Rules after it received 
the Director's determination. 
Certification - C-6030 page 2 
Included: Teacher, Co-Teacher* Resident Teacher, Guidance Counselor, 
Teacher Assistant, Social Worker, Title 1 Teacher, ELL 
Intervention Specialist, Special Education Teacher, Chorus 
Coordinator/Director and Recreational Coordinator. 
Excluded: All.other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO. 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 12,2012 
Albany, New York 
/ Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of ' 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 182, 
Petitioner, 
-and- " CASE NO. C-6121 
VILLAGE OF WHITESBORO, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the-Board, and'it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, , 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 182 has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-6121 -2 
Included: All full-time and regular part-time Motor Equipment Operators. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 182. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: June 12, 2012 
Albany, New York 
p £2_ 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of. 
NEW YORK STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICERS UNION, COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6125 
CORNING COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, ~ 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the New York State Law Enforcement Officers 
Union, Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority 
of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-6125 - 2 -
Included': All permanent, provisional and probationary full-time and part-time 
employees employed in the civil service classification College 
Security Guard; and 
Excluded: All college students registered for six or more credit hours who do 
not hold a civil service position in the title College Security Guard, 
and all other titles. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the New York State Law Enforcement Officers Union, Council 
82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual ^ 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such 
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of 
a concession. 
DATED: June 12, 2012 
Albany, New York 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 294, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6126 
TOWN OF HOOSICK, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
- A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
• r 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 294 has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. ., 
Certification - C-6126 -2 
Included: Employees of the highway department. 
Excluded: Superintendent of the highway department. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 294. The duty to negotiate collectively, 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. , 
DATED: June 12, 2012 ' 
Albany, New York 
/ Jerome Le^Kowitefuhairman 
j . 
/ Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASENO.C-6117 
MASSAPEQUA PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 
Employer, 
- and 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., . 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor/lncumbent. L 
RICHARD M. GREENSPAN, PC (MATHEW ROCOO, ESQ, of counsel), for 
Petitioner 
•> GUERCIO & GUERCIO LLP (GREGORY GILLEN, ESQ., of counsel), for 
Employer 
STEVEN A. CRAIN and DAREN J. RYLEWICZ, CO-COUNSELS (MIGUEL 
ORTIZ, ESQ., of counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On February-28, 2012, the United Public Service Employees Union (petitioner) 
filed, in accordance With the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations 
Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive representative of certain 
employees of the Massapequa Public Schools (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: Head Custodian III, Head Custodian II, Head Custodian I, 
Maintenance Supervisor II, Maintenance Supervisor I, Grounds 
Supervisor, Assistant Head Custodian, Senior Maintainer, 
Maintainer, Maintenance Helper, Custodian, Groundskeeper, 
Cleaner, Provisional Custodian, Bus Driver, Attendant and Bus 
Dispatcher. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on May 22, 2012, 
at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 12,2012. 
Albany, New York 
/ Q h a i l o Q C ^ l a l\/ Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MICHAEL A. DAVITT, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-28642 
- and -
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 844, 
Respondent, 
-and -
COUNTY OF ROCKLAND, 
Employer. 
MICHAEL A. DAVITT, pro se 
STEVEN A. CRAIN and DAREN J. RYLEWICZ, CO-COUNSELS (ELLEN 
M. MITCHELL of counsel), for Respondent 
JEFFREY J. FORTUNATO, ACTING COUNTY ATTORNEY, for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Michael A. Davitt (Davitt) to 
a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice 
charge, as amended, alleging that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 
1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 844 (CSEA) violated §§209-a.2(a) and (c) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it failed to provide him with 
representation at a scheduled hearing pursuant to Civil Service Law §72 concerning 
whether he is mentally fit to continue performing the duties of his position with the 
County of Rockland (County). 
After granting all reasonable inferences to the content of Davitt's testimony 
during the first day of hearing and his subsequent offer of proof, the ALJ dismissed the 
charge on the ground that the facts alleged by Davitt are insufficient to demonstrate a 
prima facie case of a violation of §§209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Act. Specifically, the ALJ 
concluded that Davitt could not prove an essential element to his claim: that CSEA has 
successfully provided representation to other unit members in statutory proceedings 
under Civil Service Law §72. 
In his exceptions, Davitt alleges that he was deprived of due process and 
subjected to bias on the following grounds: his requests for issuance of subpoenas 
were denied by the ALJ; his efforts to have the County attorney excluded from the pre-
hearing conference and hearing were denied; he was denied an opportunity to review 
the hearing transcript by the ALJ; he was required to make multiple written 
submissions, he received misinformation and was subject to mistreatment by 
unspecified PERB staff. 
Following our review of Davitt's exceptions, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
DISCUSSION 
In United Steelworkers, Local 9434-00 (Buchalski),2 we rearticulated the 
applicable standard for demonstrating a breach of the duty of fair representation 
concerning the failure of an employee organization to provide representation to a unit 
member with respect to a statutory claim: 
1
 45 PERB H4523(2012), 
2
 43 PERB H3002 at 3008 (2010). 
In general, the duty of fair representation does not 
include an obligation by an employee organization 
to pursue litigation on behalf of a unit member. However, if 
an employee organization has represented other unit 
members in similar litigation that was successful, and the 
evidence demonstrates that the denial of representation to 
the charging party was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad 
faith, a violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Act can be established. 
(Footnote omitted) 
In the present case, granting all reasonable inferences to the content of Davitt's 
pleadings, offer of proof and testimony, he has not set forth any facts that, if proven, 
would demonstrate a necessary element of his claim: that CSEA has provided legal 
representation and successfully litigated issues on behalf of other unit members in a 
Civil Service Law §72 hearing. While Davitt's exceptions cite purported factual 
omissions in the ALJ's decision, they are not relevant to proving this missing element of 
his case. Therefore, the ALJ's decision to dismiss his charge should be affirmed unless 
the record supports Davitt's claims that he was deprived of due process and subjected 
to bias during the processing of his charge. 
Following a careful review of Davitt's exceptions, we find no basis for his 
assertion that he was deprived of due process and an unbiased adjudicatory procedure. 
The ALJ provided Davitt with a full and fair opportunity to testify during the first 
day of hearing and to articulate supplemental facts he intended to prove through an 
offer of proof.3 Although informed that he had the burden of proving that other unit 
members were successfully represented by CSEA in a Civil Service Law §72 hearing, 
he failed to identify any facts to support that necessary element of his claim. The 
3
 Transcript, pp. 12-21. 
dismissal of his charge, based upon his pleading, offer of proof and testimony was well 
within an ALJ's discretion and does not constitute objective evidence of partiality.4 Nor 
is it a denial of due process to dismiss a charge without completing the hearing when a 
party is unable to set forth sufficient facts in an offer of proof that would demonstrate a 
violation under the Act. The primary purpose of requiring an offer of proof is to provide 
a party with an opportunity to clarify the relevant facts in dispute, if any.5 
Contrary to Davitt's assertions, the ALJ's denials of his subpoena requests do 
not constitute a denial of his due process rights or demonstrate partiality. Notably, he 
does not claim that issuance and service of the requested subpoenas would have 
resulted in the production of evidence germane to the missing element of his case. 
Pursuant to §211.1 of the Rules of Procedure (Rules), an ALJ has the discretion to 
grant or deny a request for the issuance of subpoenas. Following a review of the 
record, we conclude that the ALJ did not abuse her discretion in. denying his subpoena 
requests. 
The ALJ's denial of Davitt's requests to have the County's attorney excluded 
from the pre-hearirig conference and hearing does not violate due process principles 
nor does it demonstrate bias. Under our procedures, the County has the right to select 
the attorney to represent it before our agency. The fact that the attorney may have 
been previously involved with other related matters is not a basis for his exclusion. 
Following our review of the record, we find no evidence to support Davitt's claim 
4
 Board ofEduc of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York, 43 PERB P010 (2010). 
5
 Niagara Frontier Transit Metro System, Inc. 42 PERB 1J3023 (2009). 
that he attempted and was denied an opportunity to review the hearing transcript.6 In 
fact, Davitt did not request to review the transcript after the ALJ advised the parties that 
the transcript had been received. 
Finally, Davitt failed to comply with §213.2(b)(2) of the Rules by not providing 
specificity regarding the remainder of his exceptions. Based upon their conclusory 
nature, we are unable to discern from the record the basis for those exceptions. 
Based upon the foregoing, Davitt's exceptions are denied, and the ALJ's 
decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must Be, and it is hereby, 
dismissed. 
DATED: June 12, 2012 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Le/Kowitz^hairperson 
"" Sheila Cole, Member 
6
 Consistent with PERB practice, a party may purchase a copy of the transcript directly 
from the contract stenographic service or request an opportunity to review the transcript 
at our offices. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JULIO CESAR ROJAS, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-30500 
LOCAL 456, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS, 
Respondent, 
-and-
BOARD OF COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL 
SERVICES SOLE SUPERVISORY DISTRICT OF 
WESTCHESTER, 
Employer. 
JULIO CESAR ROJAS, pro se 
BARNES, IACCARINO & SHEPHERD, LLP (HEIDI MAHER of counsel) for 
Respondent 
KEANE & BEANE, P.C. (RONALD A. LONGO of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Julio Cesar Rojas (Rojas) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing, as untimely, his improper 
practice charge filed on October 28, 2010 alleging that Local 456, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters (Local 456) violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act). Rojas also excepts to the ALJ's denial of his cross-motion to 
amend the charge.1 
In his charge, Rojas alleges that Local 456 violated §209-a.2(c) of the Act when: a) 
it refused to assist him in filing and processing an October 2009 grievance; b) it did not 
communicate with him concerning a March 2010 grievance following an April 6, 2010 
meeting with his employer, Board of Cooperative Educational Services Sole Supervisory 
District of Westchester (BOCES); and c) it did not contact him concerning his July 15, 
2010 termination, and it did not file a contract claim and/or a statutory claim on his behalf 
challenging the discharge. BOCES is a statutory party to the charge pursuant to §209-a.3 
of the Act.2 Local 456 and BOCES each filed an answer. 
During the processing of the charge, Rojas filed an offer of proof dated May 17, 
2011, setting forth facts he intended to prove at hearing.3 Thereafter, Local 456 moved to 
dismiss the charge asserting that Rojas's claims concerning his grievances are time-
barred and that the allegations with respect to his termination fail to state a prima facie 
case of a breach of the duty of fair representation. In response, Rojas filed an "Answer in 
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and Cross-Motion to Dismiss Local 456's Pleading," 
1
 44 PERB H4612(2011). 
2
 Rojas's claim that BOCES violated §209-a1(e) of the Act by terminating him on July 15, 
2010, and by violating other provisions of the expired BOCES-Local 456 collectively 
negotiated agreement (agreement) was not processed by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) on the ground that Rojas lacks 
standing. Rojas has not filed an exception to the Director's determination; therefore, it is 
waived pursuant to §213.2(b)(4) of the Rules of Procedure (Rules). Even if Rojas had 
filed an exception, we would have affirmed the Director because a unit member does not 
have standing to pursue a charge under §209-a.1(e) of the Act. See, Bd ofEduc of the 
City Sch Dist of the City of New York, 28 PERB fl3017 (1995). 
3ALJ Exhibit 13. 
dated July 20, 2011.4 After BOCES filed an affirmation in support of Local 456's motion 
a 
and in response to Rojas's July 20, 2011 pleading, Rojas filed a "Reply to the BOCES 
Affirmation and Cross-Motion to Amend the Charge," dated August 29, 2011, which 
contains 165 numbered paragraphs of allegations and 25 attached exhibits.5 In his 
cross-motion, Rojas sought to amend his charge to allege that BOCES violated §209-
a. 1(a) of the Act by failing to render a decision concerning his March 2010 grievance, and 
it violated §§209-a. 1(a) and (c) of the Act when it terminated him on July 15, 2010.6 
EXCEPTIONS . 
In his exceptions, Rojas asserts that his allegations concerning Local 456's 
conduct regarding the March 2010 contract grievance are timely because he did not 
reasonably know that Local 456 would not further process the grievance until after he was 
terminated.7 He also contends that his charge against Local 456 is timely because it 
alleges that Local 456 did not contact him or process a claim on his behalf following his 
discharge. Finally, Rojas excepts to the ALJ's denial of his cross-motion to amend his 
4ALJ Exhibit 15. 
5
 ALJ Exhibit 20. • " 
6
 ALJ Exhibit 20, ffljl 16, 149-150. 
7
 We reject Rojas's exception challenging the ALJ's consideration of his offer of proof in 
determining Local 456's motion to dismiss. During the processing of a charge, an ALJ 
has the discretion to require a party to file an offer of proof for purposes of narrowing the 
issues in dispute and ascertaining whether a hearing is necessary. Board of Educ of the 
City Sch Dist of the City of New York (Grassel), 43 PERB 1J3010 (2010). In the present 
case, after Rojas voluntarily submitted his offer .of proof during the pre-hearing 
conference, it became a pleading that may be considered by the ALJ. In addition, any 
purported procedural infirmity associated with Rojas's offer was cured by his filing of two 
supplemental pleadings clarifying the factual and legal bases for his charge. 
charge to allege that BOCES violated §§209-a. 1 (a) of the Act when it failed to issue a 
Step 2 decision concerning his March 2010 grievance, and BOCES violated §209-a.1(a) 
and (c) when it terminated him. Local 456 and BOCES support the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision to dismiss the charge, as modified. 
FACTS 
For purposes of determining the exceptions filed by Rojas, we assume the truth of 
the allegations in his charge, as clarified by his offer of proof and his supplemental 
pleadings, dated July 20, 2011 and August 29, 2011.8 
f 
Rojas was hired by BOCES as an hourly Bus Driver-Custodian, effective 
September 1, 2009. The position is classified as a salary grade B-5 position under the 
terms of the expired BOCES-Local 456 agreement. His appointment was subject to a 
maximum fifty-two week probationary period pursuant to the applicable civil service rule. 
Under the agreement, employees working in the position of Bus Driver with C.D.L. 
License are in salary grade B-6. When he was hired, Rojas possessed a Class A 
commercial driver's license, which permits him to drive large school buses. 
At a Local 456 meeting in October 2009, Local 456 Labor Relations Consultant 
John Henry (Henry) reacted angrily to Rojas's criticism of Henry's efforts during 
negotiations with BOCES. On or about October 20,2009, Henry ordered Rojas to leave 
8
 County of Livingston, 43 PERB 1J3018 (2010); Bd ofEduc of the City Sch Dist of the City 
of New York (Grassel), 43 PERB 1(3010 (2010); Niagara Frontier Transit Metro System, 
Inc., 42 PERB fl3023 (2009). 
Henry's office in Local 456's union hall after Rojas requested a grievance form. 
According to Rojas, Henry was violent and rude when ordering him to leave the office. 
On October 29, 2009, Rojas filed a grievance with BOCES asserting that he had 
been misclassified in salary grade B-5 because he had a commercial driver's license. 
On the same day, he submitted a separate document to Local 456 accusing it of violating 
§209-a.2(c) of the Act by negotiating with BOCES to continue the salary classification 
provisions of the expired agreement.9 
The contract grievance was denied at step 1 on the grounds that it was untimely 
and because Rojas was assigned to drive a vehicle that does not require a Class A 
commercial driver's license. On November 5, 2009, Rojas attempted to meet with Henry 
concerning the grievance. Four days later, Henry sent two letters to Rojas. The first 
letter stated that Local 456 had decided not to pursue his contract grievance following an 
evaluation of its merits. In the second letter, Henry rejected Rojas's assertion that Local 
456's negotiation posture violates the Act. In a letter to Henry dated November 15, 2009, 
Rojas reiterated his claim that Local 456 was violating §209-a.2(c) of the Act by 
negotiating a successor agreement that would deprive equal pay for equal work for new 
employees. 
In a second grievance dated March 4, 2010, Rojas alleged that BOCES violated 
the agreement by refusing to place him oh the seniority list applicable to salary grade B-6 
drivers for non-scheduled driving assignments including field and shopping trips. On 
March 12, 2010, the second grievance was denied at step 1 on the ground that Rojas was 
9
 Although Rojas labeled this document to Local 456 as a "grievance," it alleges a 
violation of the Act, and not a violation of the BOCES-Local 456 expired agreement. 
employed in a salary grade B-5 driver position, and therefore, he was properly on the 
seniority list applicable to that position. 
Following Rojas's request that Local 456 pursue his grievance to arbitration, Local 
456's counsel sent a letter to BOCES requesting that the grievance be processed to Step 
2. The letter also sought information from BOCES relating to the grievance. After 
. receiving a copy of Local 456's counsel's letter to BOCES, Rojas faxed a letter to Local 
456's counsel stating that she is not his attorney and she is not authorized to request that 
the grievance be heard at Step 2. Local 456's counsel responded to Rojas's fax with a 
letter stating that she was authorized to represent the union and its members within the 
context of the agreement, and that if Rojas did not want Local 456's representation, he 
must submit a signed written notification. In addition, Henry sent a letter to BOCES 
stating that it should not discuss the grievance directly with Rojas without the presence of 
Local 456's counsel or another designated union representative. 
On March 23, 2010, Local 456's counsel sent a letter to Rojas informing him that 
BOCES wanted to schedule a meeting concerning his second grievance on April 6 or 7, 
2010. In addition, she reiterated that he had to submit a signed written notification if he " 
did not want continued Local 456 representation concerning the grievance. In response, 
Rojas faxed a letter to her stating that he would accept her representation on two 
conditions: she meet with him to prepare for the meeting with BOCES, and that they 
mutually agree upon the issues and remedies associated with his grievance.10 
Rojas sent another letter to Local 456's counsel dated March 29, 2010, outlining 
his interpretations of the agreement, the grievance procedure, the Act, and the ethical 
10
 There is no evidence in the record demonstrating that Local 456's counsel agreed to . 
Rojas's conditions. 
obligations of union counsel to a grievant. With respect to the latter issue, Rojas stated 
that Local 456's counsel could not represent him without his express consent because of 
the potential for a conflict of interest between him and Local 456. 
On April 1, 2010, Rojas met with Local 456's counsel and other representatives, 
including Henry, to discuss the grievance and to prepare for the meeting with BOCES. 
During the meeting, Local 456's counsel and Henry expressed their opinion that Rojas's 
grievance lacked merit. 
Representatives of BOCES and Local 456, along with Rojas, met on April 6, 2010 
to discuss the pending grievance. During the meeting, a BOCES representative 
mentioned the possibility of promoting Rojas to a B-6 salary grade position as a means of 
settling the grievance. This idea generated a discussion regarding back wages and the 
respective rights of other B-5 salary grade drivers with greater seniority than Rojas. 
Ultimately, a BOCES representative stated that she would need an additional week to 
render a Step 2 decision. Between the April 6, 2010 meeting and the filing of the charge, 
Rojas did not receive a Step 2 decision from BOCES, nor was he contacted by Local 
456's counsel or other representatives concerning the status of his grievance. 
Unbeknownst to Rojas, on or about April 20, 2010, Local 456's counsel spoke with 
a BOCES representative about resolving the grievance in the context of the parties' 
continued negotiations for a successor agreement. During a bargaining session one 
week later, BOCES and Local 456 discussed a proposal to promote all B-5 salary grade 
drivers to the B-6 salary grade. In addition, it was agreed that the grievance would be 
placed on hold. Rojas did not learn of the discussions at negotiations until he received 
Local 456's counsel's affirmation dated July 13, 2011 in support of Local 456's motion to 
dismiss the charge. 
On June 4, 2010, Rojas was questioned by a BOCES representative concerning 
his conduct during an incident that day. During the questioning, Rojas was represented 
by a Local 456 representative because Rojas was a potential subject of disciplinary 
action. Later that day, Rojas was suspended without pay pending completion of the 
disciplinary investigation. While under suspension, Rojas received a letter informing him 
that the BOCES Board would be considering a recommendation that he be discharged 
prior to the expiration of his probationary period under the applicable civil service rule. 
Rojas was terminated by BOCES, effective July 15, 2010. Prior to filing his charge, Rojas 
did not request representation by Local 456 to challenge his discharge. Although Local 
456 received copies of letters concerning the discharge it did not contact him or file a 
grievance or legal claim on his behalf. 
DISCUSSION 
Pursuant to §204.1(a)(1) of the Rules, the four-month time period for filing a charge 
commences when a charging party had actual or constructive knowledge of the act or 
acts that form the basis for the charge11 or the date that such conduct could have 
11
 Solvay Union Free Sch Dist, 45 PERB1J3023 (2012); Nanuet Union Free Sch Dist, 45 
PERB1J3007 (2012); New York State ThruwayAuth, 40 PERB 1J3014 (2007); City of 
Binghamton, 31 PERB |f3088 (1998); City of Oswego, 23 PERB |[3007 (1990). 
reasonably been discovered. We strictly apply the timeliness requirement, and it is not 
tolled by the pendency of a grievance or other related matters.13 
In the present case, we affirm the ALJ's dismissal of Rojas's allegations 
concerning the processing of his March 2010 grievance as untimely under §204.1(a)(1) of 
the Rules. Rojas's allegations are untimely because the charge was filed on October 28, 
2010, more than four months after he knew or should have known of Local 456's conduct. 
Contrary to Rojas's contention, his allegations with respect to the handling of his 
grievance did not accrue on July 15, 2010, the date of his termination. 
As early as October and November 2009, Rojas accused Local 456 of violating 
§209-a.2(c) of the Act. By April 6, 2010, he knew the following: Local 456 had refused to 
pursue his first contract grievance because it lacked merit; Local 456's counsel and Henry 
had informed him that his March 2010 grievance was meritless; Local 456 had not 
processed that grievance to arbitration as he had demanded; and BOCES and Local 456 
were in the midst of negotiating a successor agreement. He later knew that BOCES did 
f 
not issue a Step 2 decision within a week of the April 6, 2010 meeting, as promised. 
The fact that Rojas's second grievance was placed on hold in April 2010, pending 
negotiations, could have been discovered by his simply asking Local 456. Following the 
April 6, 2010 meeting, however, Rojas did not ask Local 456 about the status of the 
grievance, even while being represented on June 4, 2011. 
12
 State of New York (GOER), 22 PERB1J3009 (1989); Bd ofEdu of the City Sch Dist of 
the City of New York (Chamberlin), 15 PERB 1J3050 (1982). 
13
 State of New York (Insurance Department Liquidation Bureau)(Smulyan), 45 PERB 
3008 (2012); TWU (Edwards), 45 PERB TJ3014 (2012); New York State ThruwayAuth, 
supra, note 11. 
While an employee organization is obligated to respond to reasonable inquiries by 
a unit member concerning his or her grievance, the duty of fair representation does not 
require it to provide the unit member with periodic status reports concerning a grievance1' 
Furthermore, placing a grievance on hold pending the outcome of negotiations is well 
within the wide range of reasonable discretion granted an employee organization under 
the Act in the processing of a grievance.15 
Although Rojas's allegations against Local 456 concerning his discharge are 
timely, he has failed to allege sufficient facts which, if proven, would demonstrate a 
violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Act. In general, an employee organization does not have 
an affirmative obligation under the Act to initiate contact with a unit member about filing a 
contract grievance or legal action in response to an adverse employment action, and it is 
not obligated to pursue such claims without a unit member's request.16 Furthermore, an 
employee organization is not required under the Act to pursue a non-contractual legal 
claim on behalf of a unit member unless it has successfully pursued similar claims on 
behalf of other unit members.17 
14
 United Transportation Union, Local 1140 (Wactor), 30 PERB fl3071 (1997). 
15
 Nassau Comm Coll Fed of Teachers (Staskowski), 42 PERB 1J3007 (2009). 
16
 In the present case, Local 456's failure to unilaterally act on Rojas's behalf is consistent 
with his assertion to Local 456's counsel that he could not be represented by Local 456 
without his express consent. We note that under other facts and circumstances, an 
employee organization might be required to unilaterally act on behalf of a unit member 
based upon the terms of a collectively negotiated agreement or a particular practice of 
that employee organization. 
17
 UFT (Morrell), 44 PERB 1J3030 (2011); United Steelworkers, Local 9434-00 (Buchalski), 
43 PERB ^3002(2010). 
In his charge and supplemental pleadings, Rojas does not allege that he contacted 
Local 456 and that it refused to provide him with representation to challenge his 
discharge. Nor does he allege any facts that would demonstrate that Local 456 was 
discriminatory, arbitrary or acted in bad faith by not initiating contact with him, or pursuing 
a contract or legal claim on his behalf, with regard to his discharge. Based upon the 
foregoing, we affirm the dismissal of Rojas's claim against Local 456 concerning his 
discharge. 
Finally, we affirm the ALJ's denial of Rojas's cross-motion to amend his charge to 
allege that BOCES violated §209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act. Consistent with §204.1(d) of 
the Rules, an ALJ has considerable discretion to grant or deny a request to amend a 
charge so long as the decision is consistent with due process.18 In the present case, the 
cross-motion seeks to add untimely claims against BOCES that do not relate back to his 
statutory claims against Local 456. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it is hereby, 
dismissed. 
DATED: June 12, 2012 .', . 
Albany, New York 
/ Sheila Cole, Member 
18
 Board ofEduc of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York (Grassel), 41 PERB 1J3024 
(2008); UFT(Ayazi), 32 PERB H3069 (1999); Village of Johnson City, 12 PERB P020 
(1979). 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon our review of the exceptions filed by the City of Middletown (City) to 
the decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ),1 and the response filed by the 
Middletown Professional Firefighters Association Local 1027, IAFF, AFL-CIO 
(Association), we affirm the ALJ's decision finding that the City violated §209-a.1(d) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it refused the Association's 
1
 45 PERB 1(4548(2012). 
demand to negotiate the impact of the City's decision to replace a tiller truck staffed by 
two Association unit members with a ladder truck staffed by one unit member in the 
City's fire department. The case was submitted to the ALJ on a stipulated record, 
which aided in an expedited final resolution of the issues raised by the charge. 
FACTS 
After the City unilaterally decided to replace a two-person tiller truck with a one-
person ladder truck in the fire department, the Association demanded that the City 
negotiate the impact of the City's decision.2 Ten days later, the City rejected the 
Association's demand for impact negotiations on the ground that the decision "to 
purchase or replace fire trucks is both a managerial prerogative under the contract and 
pursuant to the City Charter."3 
In response to the City's unilateral decision the Association also filed a grievance 
under the parties' collectively negotiated agreement (agreement). The City successfully 
pursued a special proceeding to stay arbitration of that grievance pursuant to CPLR 
§7503(c), resulting in a decision and order in New York State Supreme Court.4 In 
granting the City's petition, the Court concluded that the City had exclusive authority to 
purchase firefighting equipment under the City Charter. Additionally, the Court held that 
the agreement did not reveal an intent by the parties to arbitrate the purchase or 
replacement of firefighting equipment, concluding that the City's actions did not violate 
2
 Joint Exhibi t ! 
3
 Joint Exhibit 2. 
4
 Joint Exhibit 3(G). 
the past practice or the unsafe conditions clauses of the agreement. With respect to 
the second contract provision, the Court found that "[n]othing in the record suggests 
that the City has reduced firehouse staffing or has reduced the number of paid 
firefighters responding to a call."5 The Association has filed a notice of appeal from the 
order staying arbitration. 
DISCUSSION 
Although certain employer decisions, such as the staffing assigned to an 
employer's vehicle are nonmandatory, the impact of those decisions must be 
negotiated upon demand.6 The City's managerial prerogative to purchase the new 
truck and to staff it with one unit member does not eliminate its obligation to negotiate 
the impact of those decisions, as requested by the Association.7 
An employer's obligation to negotiate impact does not require an employee 
organization to first demonstrate to the employer's satisfaction that the employer's 
action has or will have a material impact upon terms and conditions of employment. 
Similarly, an employer cannot refuse to negotiate impact based upon its conclusion that 
no impact exists or because it believes the impact is de minimus.8 Such arguments go 
5
 Joint Exhibit 3(G), p.3. 
6
 County of Erie v State of New York Pub Empl Rel Bd, 12 NY3d 72, 42 PERB TJ7002 
(2009); West Irondequoit Teachers Assn v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 35 NY2d 
46, 7 PERB 1J7014 (1974); Lake Mohegan Fire Dist, 41 PERB 1J3001 (2008); City Sch 
Dist of the City of New Rochelle, 4 PERB 1J3060 (1971). 
7
 County of Nassau, 27 PERB 1J3054 (1994). 
8
 CityofWatertown, 10 PERB1J3008 (1977); Suffolk County BOCES, Second 
Supervisory Dist., 17 PERB U 3111(1984). 
to the merits of the Association's concerns, which should be raised in the context of 
impact negotiations between the parties. 
Finally, we reject the City's argument that the charge is barred by the principles 
of res judicata and collateral estoppel based upon the judicial decision and order 
staying arbitration. The issue determined by the Court was the arbitrability of the 
Association's contract grievance challenging the City's decisions under the terms of the 
agreement; it did not determine whether the City has a duty to engage in good faith 
impact negotiations under the Act. Pursuant to §205.5(d) of the Act, our agency has 
the exclusive and nondelegable jurisdiction to determine the latter issue. Through 
impact negotiations, the Association can seek to persuade the City that an impact does 
exist, and to accept the Association's proposal to remedy that impact. Nothing in our 
decision, however, constitutes a collateral attack on the Court's decision and order 
staying arbitration. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the City's exceptions and affirm the ALJ's 
decision that the City violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act by refusing the Association's 
demand for impact negotiations. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, HEREBY ORDERED that the City will: 
1. Forthwith respond to the Association's request to schedule impact negotiations; 
2. Not refuse to engage in impact negotiations concerning the City's decision to 
replace the fire department tiller truck staffed by two Association unit members with 
a ladder truck staffed by one unit member; and . 
3. Sign, post and distribute the attached notice at all physical and electronic locations 
customarily used to post notices to unit employees. 
DATED: June 12, 2012 
Albany, New York . 
. / Sheila Cole, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the City of Middletown in the unit represented by the 
Middletown Professional Firefighters Association, Inc., Local 1027, IAFF, AFL-CIO, that 
the City of Middletown will: 
1. Forthwith respond to the Association's request to schedule impact negotiations; and 
2. Not refuse to engage in impact negotiations concerning the City's decision to replace 
the fire department tiller truck staffed by two Association unit members with a ladder 
truck staffed by one unit member. 
Dated By 
on behalf of CITY OF MIDDLETOWN 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
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- and -
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JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Charging Party 
ROEMER, WALLENS, GOLD & MINEAUX LLP (WILLIAM M. WALLENSand 
JONATHAN H. KERR of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Town of Ulster (Town) 
to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper practice charge filed 
by the Town of Ulster Policemen's Benevolent Association (PBA) finding that the Town 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
submitted two demands in response to PBA's petition for interest arbitration, which 
were first presented at mediation and are not reasonably related to the subject matter of 
negotiations or discussions during mediation.1 
The Town's exceptions are limited to its argument that the following proposition 
in Village ofWappingers Falls2 (Wappingers Falls) should be reversed: 
1
 45 PERB ^4553(2012). 
2
 40 PERB U3020 (2007). 
The submission of a proposal to interest arbitration that is 
presented for the first time at mediation and is not 
reasonably related to the subject matter of the negotiations 
and/or the discussions during mediation, may under the 
totality of the circumstances, violate §205.6(a)(2) of the 
Rules. 
According to the Town, parties should be permitted to submit to interest 
arbitration any new proposals presented for the first time at mediation because 
mediation is a continuation of negotiations. Although PBA supports the ALJ's decision, 
it seeks to reargue Wappingers Falls, claiming that the decision has damaged the Act's 
collective bargaining procedures by permitting a party to submit a proposal to interest 
arbitration that satisfies the reasonable relationship test.3 
In Village/Town of Mount Kisco,4 we reaffirmed our conclusion in Wappingers 
Falls but dismissed the charge noting that the charging party failed to prove, under the 
totality of the circumstances, that respondent's proposal during mediation was not 
reasonably related to the subject matter of the negotiations or the parties' discussions 
during mediation. 
Mediation, an essential component of the impasse procedures under the Act, 
constitutes a continuation of negotiations where parties may continue to exchange 
proposals and counterproposals.5 It is not, however, a forum for a party to expand the 
scope of the impasse to be determined later at interest arbitration or fact-finding. Nor is 
it a mere speed-bump on the road to final impasse resolution. 
3
 Brief Submitted on Behalf of the Town of Ulster Policemen's Benevolent Association, 
Inc, p. 4. 
4
 45 PERB H3017(2012). 
5
 Board ofEduc of the City Sen Dist of the City of New York, 45 PERB 1J3026 (2012). 
The reasonable relationship test articulated in Wappingers Falls is aimed at 
enhancing the likelihood that the divide between the parties can be narrowed during the 
course of mediation over the subject matter of their negotiations and/or their 
discussions at mediation. Whether there is a reasonable relationship is dependent 
upon the totality of the circumstances as demonstrated from the factual record before 
us. At the same time, proof of a purposeful delay by a party in making a new proposal 
at mediation or evidence that a party has refused to participate in efforts at reaching a 
mediated resolution, may demonstrate a refusal to negotiate in good faith in violation of 
§§209-a.1(d) or 209-a.2(b) of the Act. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Town's exceptions are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Town withdraw from interest arbitration 
those portions of Town proposal 7 seeking increases in employee health insurance 
contributions in 2011 and 2012, and proposals 8 and 9. 
DATED: June 12, 2012 
Albany, New York 
//Jerome Lefko^itz, Chairperson 
S Sheila Cole, Member 
